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Abstract 
During the last forty years evidence from systematic case study analysis and behavioral 
experiments have provided a comprehensive perspective on how communities can manage 
common resources in a sustainable way. The conventional theory based on selfish rational actors 
cannot explain empirical observations. A more comprehensive theoretical framework of human 
behavior is emerging that include concepts such as trust, conditional cooperation, other-
regarding preferences, social norms, and reputation. The new behavioural perspective also 
demonstrates that behavioral responses depend on social and biophysical context. 
 
Introduction 
One of the main key challenges in environmental sustainability is the governance of common 
resources. The 1968 essay by biologist Garrett Hardin [1] located the topic in the center of the 
increasing awareness of the human impact on the environment. Hardin envisioned a pasture open 
to all, in which each herder received an individual benefit from adding sheep to graze on the 
common land and suffered costs only later (costs that were shared with other herders) from 
overgrazing. The only two interventions proposed that would prevent overharvesting the 
commons were the establishment of private property rights or taxing the use of common 
resources. Hardin concluded that overuse of the commons was inevitable since users – assumed 
to be motivated by self-interest – will not self-organize. 
 Hardin’s judgment became widely accepted due to its consistency with predictions from 
non-cooperative game theory, the economics of resource use, and well-noted examples of 
resource collapses [2, 3, 4]. The consequences of this work were significant. Hardin and others 
distinguished three types of property rights: communal, private and state. However, communal 
property was equated with the absence of exclusive and effective rights and thus an inability to 
govern the commons. From this perspective, sustainable use of shared resources was only 
possible when there was little demand or a low population density. 
 However, if Hardin was right, why are so many common resources not overharvested? In 
this paper we focus on the insights from behavioral studies that provide a better understanding 
why self-governance is possible. Those behavioral studies – mainly experimental – were 
motivated by stylized facts from comparative case study analysis. 
 
Meta-analysis of case studies 
In the mid-1980s, a group of interdisciplinary scholars who perform field studies began to 
discover that the empirical evidence was not consistent with conventional theory [5]. In order to 
understand the diversity of outcomes from individual case studies there was a need for synthesis. 
A large number of case studies were accumulated over the years that showed both successes and 
failures of self-organization of resource users. The resources included local fisheries, irrigation 
systems, pastures and forests. Elinor Ostrom [6], a political economist, was one of the leading 
forces during this period and, in 2009, won the Nobel Prize in economic sciences for her 
contributions on the study of the governance of common resources. She had developed the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, which was one of the tools used to 
systematically organize the information from the many case studies available [7, 8*]. The IAD 
framework is a meta-theoretical framework that identifies action situations, patterns of 
interactions and outcomes, and an evaluation of these outcomes (Figure 1). The action situation 
is one in which people interact in various different ways, such as exchanging of goods, meeting, 
and deliberating.  
 
 
Figure 1: A framework for institutional analysis. Adapted from Ostrom [8*]. 
 
 The action situation is influenced by contextual variables such as the biophysical 
attributes of a resource (e.g., size, spatial and temporal dynamics, predictability), the attributes of 
the community (e.g., size, heterogeneity) and the rules used by participants to govern their 
interactions. The interactions of participants lead to outcomes (e.g., state of the resource, 
distribution of income of participants). Participants can evaluate the outcomes of the interactions 
and may adjust their actions, including the rules in use. 
 The action situation acknowledges that people can have different positions such as 
consumer, producer, official, harvester, guard, etc. These positions can affect access to 
information and resources and therefore define some of the power differences in communities. 
The positions people hold in an action situation affect the actions they can take, such as whether 
they can give permits, are allowed to access the resource, etc. The outcomes are evaluated by 
their costs and benefits, realizing that these costs and benefits are not necessarily monetary in 
their nature. 
 The IAD framework (Figure 1) explicitly distinguishes rules-in-use in contrast to rules-
on-paper. The reason for this is that it is more effective to study the actual behavior with relation 
to the common-pool resource. It is not necessarily the case that rules-on-paper are known or 
accepted by all participants in the system. Collecting information about the actual rules people 
use in their decision making is important to understand their motivations and incentives for the 
decisions they make. It will also be helpful to understand what actions are needed to avoid 
undesirable outcomes. 
 Ostrom [9] presented an initial analysis of a systematic effort to code hundreds of case 
studies of fisheries and irrigation systems. Originally the goal was to find the institutional 
arrangements that would lead to the best outcomes of the governance of common-pool resources. 
However, she was not able to specify rules that generated success. Instead she formulated a set of 
lessons learned, which she called design principles, that were generally found to be present in 
cases of successful governance of common-pool resources. These design principles included 
well-defined boundaries of resource systems and social groups, proportional equivalence 
between benefits and costs, collective-choice arrangements, implementation of effective 
monitoring of resource conditions and rule compliance, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution 
mechanisms, and minimal recognition of rights. The final design principle is on nested 
enterprises when resources are part of a larger system, different nested layers should be 
organized to match the activities of the local users and the biophysical conditions.  
The proposed design principles have been tested in many publications since Ostrom and 
they are well supported empirically [10]. This does not mean that other factors are not important. 
Future work will need to test what the main factors are in each circumstance.  
 
Experimental results 
The analysis of field studies shows that the conventional model of human behavior did not hold. 
People are able to govern their commons in sustainable ways without external interventions. In 
order to derive an alternative theory it is important to replicate the findings from field settings in 
more controlled situations. Since the late 1980s, laboratory and field experiments have been 
performed that confirm the insights from the field studies [11]. This is important for the 
development of theory since observations in field studies might be disregarded by some scholars 
as anecdotal. Replicating field observations in controlled experiments with diverse populations 
provides specific insights into what enhances the likelihood of self-governance of common-pool 
resources.  
Hardin’s prediction of the tragedy of the commons was demonstrated if participants 
cannot communicate or have any institutional arrangements to govern their common resources 
[11,12*]. On average the participants harvest the level of earnings similar to the predicted Nash 
equilibrium [11]. However, if cheap talk or costly punishment is allowed, participants are able to 
derive much higher earnings as a group and avoid overharvesting. In cheap talk participants are 
allowed to communicate, face-to-face or in chat-rooms on the internet, but cannot enforce their 
agreements [11,12*]. In the context of non-cooperative game theory, cheap talk is viewed as 
irrelevant and therefore the findings of Ostrom and colleagues on its effectiveness are 
remarkable [11]. The use of costly-punishment was observed in field studies, but was not 
consistent with the theory of norm-free, complete rational selfish behavior of actors [13]. In 
costly-punishment, users pay a fee to reduce the earnings of someone else [14]. It was shown that 
participants use costly punishment and that this leads to a reduction of the harvesting rate 
[11,12*]. Recent studies on costly-punishment show that creating institutional arrangements due 
to centralized sanctioning mechanisms are more effective and sustainable compared to peer 
punishment [15**, 16]. 
During the last few years more ecological complexity is included in experiments to 
capture non-linear effects, asymmetry and uncertainty [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Main 
factors affecting cooperative behavior remain trust, conditional cooperation, communication and 
sanctioning. Additionally those studies show that the uncertainty affects cooperation – typically 
declines – and that the biophysical context can reduce information flows and therefore 
cooperation [17, 22,23]. 
 These findings have been replicated by experiments in the field with traditional resource 
users like farmers and fishers. Those field experiments increases the external validity of results 
[25**, 26]. For example, experiments have been performed with forest resource users in rural 
Colombia [27]. Instead of talking about abstract resources, the experiment was framed as 
investing hours in collecting fuel wood from the common resource. The participants received a 
payoff table that helped them to make decision on how much time to spend in fuel wood 
extraction and how much for alternative activities [27]. Similar to lab experiments, field 
experiments start to include more ecological complexity in their natural resource dilemmas [28. 
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34]. In contrast to lab experiments, studies find that cultural factors, 
experiences with specific institutional arrangements and ecological conditions can affect the way 
participants make decisions in those experiments [26, 29, 32]. This demonstrates that 
effectiveness of interventions is context specific. 
 A specific topic of interest in field experiments is the problem of crowding out [35, 36, 
37, 38**, 39*]. This means that imposing rules that would lead to cooperative solutions is 
followed lead to lower performance compared to voluntarily-agreed upon rules. This has 
implications for interventions, including payment for ecosystem services. Behavior motivated by 
moral obligations and social preferences can be undermined by economic interventions [38**]. 
However, a recent study in an authoritarian society shows that in some societies imposing 
behavior leads to higher compliance compared to self-governance [39*]. 
  
Contemporary theory of collective action and the commons 
The accumulation of studies using various methods to study collective action and the commons 
during the last few decades has provided material for a revision of the theory.  Poteete et al. [40]  
presents an alternative framework of collective action and the commons based on field studies 
and experiments and stress the importance of micro-situational variables, the broader context, 
and the relationship between them (Figure 2). The conventional theory was pristine in the 
simplicity of its model of human behavior. All individuals were thought to be selfish and 
rational. Individuals were assumed to have complete information about the structure of the 
situation they are in, including the preferences of other actors, the full range of possible actions, 




Figure 2: Conceptual framework of collective action where broader context and micro-situational 
variables affect the levels of trust and cooperation (based on Poteete et al. [40]). 
 Decades of field work and experiments emphasized that not all humans behave like selfish 
rational beings, and that participants do not have complete information about all situations of 
interest to theorists. The alternative framework provided by Poteete et al. [40] is not complete 
but provides a starting point to identify the important attributes of action situations that need to 
be measured in empirical studies. 
Instead of assuming selfish rational individuals maximizing a particular type of payoff 
function with complete information, analyses need to be based on assumptions about individuals 
who have imperfect knowledge, who learn and adopt norms, and who are influenced by micro-
situational and broader contextual variables. Especially important is the notion of other-regarding 
preferences and conditional cooperation. The majority of participants in experiments are 
classified as conditional cooperators [41]. They will cooperate in collective action situations if 
they expect others will do so too. This explains why communication – cheap talk – is so 
effective. Communication enables participants to signal their intensions and trustworthiness [12, 
42]. Not only do participants cooperate if they expect that others will, they also value and receive 
emotional benefits if others receive good earnings too and that the earnings are fairly distributed 
among the participants [43, 44]. The assumptions that humans make in collective action 
situations and how incentives affect their decisions enable us to provide a more elaborate 
theoretical framework on the governance of the commons. 
Poteete et al. [40] believe that behavior is more directly influenced by micro-situational 
variables, which in turn are influenced by the broader contextual variables (Figure 2). Examples 
of micro-situational variables include group size, heterogeneity among participants, reputation 
and time horizons. Larger groups will make it more difficult to evaluate the trustworthiness of all 
other participants and make it easier to free ride on actions of others. The various forms in which 
people can access information to judge trustworthiness and the reputation of others is important 
for the ability of groups to solve collective action problems. 
Examples of broader contexts are policies at higher levels of organization, resource 
dynamics, history of social relationships and geography. What is the constitutional context, the 
cultural background and the physical geography in which decisions are made? And how are they 
influenced by price volatility at the world market, migration flows, climate change, and policy 
interventions [45, 46].  
   
Challenges ahead 
The majority of the work on collective action and the commons have been focused on 
small communities. There is a convincing amount of evidence that small communities are able to 
overcome the tragedy of the commons in the right context. But in a globalizing world there is an 
increasing interest in finding solutions to collective action problems at multiple levels of scale. 
You need to have global and national level policies for certain aspects of the solution, but you 
also need to nurture and stimulate local initiatives [47]. For a problem like climate change, local 
initiatives may focus on indicators appealing to the local level like carpooling to reduce air 
pollution, bicycling to improve health and using solar energy to reduce the energy bill.  
In modern urbanized environments it will be more difficult to evaluate the 
trustworthiness of all other participants and make it easier to free ride on actions of others. The 
information that one can derive regarding the reputation of others can have an important 
influence of decision making. New information technologies reduce the costs to communicate 
with a larger number of people who are not necessarily physically co-located. For example, 
smart metering of water and energy use provides real time feedback on household consumption 
and compares this to the metrics of the neighborhood. We can learn from findings in social 
psychology about how to use descriptive norms to provide feedback that may keep conditional 
cooperators cooperating. An exemplar application is the use of social feedback on energy bills 
[48, 49, 50]. 
 The rapid information technology development makes it possible to derive real-time 
accurate information on the consequences of our decisions and the decisions of others. 
Increasingly people participate in various online social networks that make it possible to share 
and compare information and connect people with similar interests. This provides opportunities 
to scale up the strengths of self-governance as is observed in communities.  
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